Broad-policy S3 identities can escalate to IAM admin
CriticalPublished
GHSA-jw56-gm6j-34mp lets a broad-policy SeaweedFS S3 identity escalate to administrative control of the IAM store.
- Affected
- SeaweedFS 4.40 and earlier
- Attack requirements
- A valid S3 identity with an attached policy allowing s3:* on Resource: * and access to the weed iam HTTP port
- Weakness
- CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
Impact
A normal S3 identity with a broad data-plane policy can gain administrative control of the IAM credential store. The attacker can create users, mint keys for other accounts, attach administrative policies, or remove existing identities.
Technical detail
- The standalone server routes IAM management actions through one POST endpoint and calls VerifyActionPermission with empty bucket and object values.
- The policy evaluator resolves that request to s3:* against arn:aws:s3:::, so a policy allowing s3:* on Resource: * also authorizes IAM administration.
- The default embedded IAM path is not affected because it uses an iam-prefixed action and a dedicated IAM resource.
Remediation
- Remove untrusted network access to the standalone weed iam service.
- Avoid broad s3:* and Resource: * grants; scope data-plane policies to the required actions and resources.
- Use the embedded IAM path where possible and follow the upstream advisory for release-specific guidance.